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1 Introduction 
1.1 Evolution of networks 
Many of today’s networks are the result of network and protocol design decisions 
initially made in the 1970s. In the 1970s it was predicted that 32 bits would suffice to 
cover the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that networks and the Internet would ever 
need. However, for example, RIPE NCC ran out of IPv4 Addresses on 25 November 
2019 (RIPE NCC 2019). Networks were also considered to be fairly static. Defects of 
traditional networks include their static nature in contrast to the dynamic nature of 
today’s application and user requirements. Once networks were once established, 
network requirements and topology were not expected to change much, if at all. 
General conclusion is that network requirements have evolved more rapidly but 
generally technologies and operations have not. (Anderson & Morreale 2014) 
Software-defined networks (SDNs) are a recent innovation in networking. Server 
virtualization has contributed to the development of networks in datacenters; 
however, change in campus and Local Area Network technologies has been more 
moderate. The heart of software-defined networking (SDN), the integration of 
virtualization and networking, has enabled cuts in operation costs and limitations in 
current network configurations. (Anderson & Morreale 2014)  
There will be a real revolution in the Local Area Networks (LANs) and network 
operations. It has been predicted that in end of 2020, only 40% of network 
operations teams will use the command line interface (CLI) as their primary interface. 
In 2018 the same figure was 75%. Also, adoption of cloud-managed networks by 
businesses of all sizes will at least double from less than 10% in 2018 to more than 
20% by year-end 2023 (Menezes, Canales, Zimmerman & Toussaint 2018). Excessive 
administrative overhead and complexity of traditional network configuration 
interferes with meeting business networking standards. Also, cloud computing giants 
Amazon and Google have stated that “business critical services require more 
predictable, reliable and measurable networks” and “machines should configure 
machines” (Mist 2019). There is a need for transformation from the network centric 
architecture to application and policy-driven architecture. In the future business 
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drivers should define network intent and dictate the mechanics of network behavior 
and connectivity. 
Traditional network security architecture breaks different networks into segments or 
zones. These segments are granted a different level of trust, which determines the 
network resources it is permitted to reach. Usually communication between the 
segments is established with one or more firewalls. This model provides very strong 
defense-in-depth but lacks granular security. Network centric security architecture 
for example restricts the flexibility in host (client or server) placement. These 
restrictions can be overcome by leveraging distributed policy enforcement and 
centralized control over the security policy. (Gilman & Barth 2017) 
This thesis has strong healthcare networking point of view. Healthcare networks in 
hospitals are evolving, growing and becoming more complex but clinicians have to 
access their mission-critical systems in secure manner without any interruption. In 
modern hospitals there is need for a massive amount of connected IoT and medical 
devices, most of which are portable. The generation of sophisticated medical 
devices, the increasing adoption of telemedicine and collaboration between 
healthcare organizations such as hospitals, pharmacies and laboratories has placed 
increasing demands for network infrastructure and security. (Nadimi & Plemon 2018) 
Globally malware attacks in healthcare have become more common. Figures in The 
State of Healthcare Cybersecurity report from Malwarebytes state there has been a 
60% increase in Trojan malware detections in the first nine months of 2019 
compared with the entirety of 2018. The rise has been particularly significant in the 
third quarter of 2019 with an 82% increase in detections when compared with the 
previous quarter. Some of this malware has been known to deliver malicious 
payloads such as ransomware to compromised systems. Adam Kujawa, director of 
Malwarebytes Labs has said that “For too long, these organizations have suffered 
due to antiquated equipment and underfunded IT departments, making them 
especially vulnerable. We should be arming healthcare now with extensive security 
measures”. (Palmer 2019) 
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1.2 Background of the project 
Network engineers meet different kinds of network and security issues daily. Some of 
these issues or problems can be difficult and time-consuming to solve. (Kumar & 
Mozar 2018, 31.) This is many often at least partly due to network variations and 
complexity. Networks tends to be like snowflakes, there is no two alike (Hill, Miller, 
Zacks, Suhr, Thatikonda, Karmarkar, Hooda, Kondalam, Prasad, Wargo, Arena, 
Katkade& Pendharkar 2018, 16). For example, some new network technologies and 
equipment have been implemented in a new hospital building; however, the rest of 
the campus has remained untouched. Usually, this occurs due to the accommodation 
of new features and design approaches. In the end this makes the network complex 
to understand, troubleshoot, predict, and upgrade. 
Normally when someone talks about network problem, it usually means availability 
and scalability issues.  Traditionally, there are also other information security issues 
than just availability to be concerned. This can be an inconsistent level of security 
between wired and wireless clients or lack of end-to-end security policy with user or 
device identity. One of the main research areas of this thesis is network 
segmentation, which can efficiently control lateral movement in networks (Chismon 
2019). 
The author’s employer Istekki Oy is an in-house company providing information, 
communication and medical technology (ICMT) services to public sector 
shareholders. In the end of 2018, the networking team decided to build Cisco 
Software-Defined Access (Cisco SD-Access) Proof of Concept (PoC) environment for 
Istekki office network. This was how this thesis project started. It was decided that 
along with the construction of the PoC network, the solution is tested and evaluated 
as to how the solution would fit into hospital networks. 
Another motive is to study what kind of implementations of medical networks there 
are currently. The ultimate motive is to deepen the author’s knowledge in the field 
network security and get familiar with modern technologies. 
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1.3 Research methods 
This thesis is a development project assigned by the author’s employer. This project 
focuses on empirical and qualitative research of information security phenomena in 
software-defined networking. First, the theoretical basis of the software-defined 
networking in general is studied. Then challenges in traditional networking are 
examined and the segmentation practices in the medical networks of two Finnish 
university hospitals are researched. Network and healthcare technology experts are 
interviewed to gain knowledge about the special requirements of medical networks 
as well as information about the current segmentation practices and challenges. Test 
cases of this research are part of the case study that focuses on segmentation 
practices and features of the policy-driven networking in Cisco SD-Access. Linking of 
the case study research to an earlier theoretical basis forms the basis for the analyses 
and interpretations in the conclusions. 
The practical implementation involves building of Cisco SD-Access PoC environment 
of the Istekki office network. Empirical test cases examine and demonstrates SDN 
behavior and segmentation in policy-driven architecture. Practical test cases are 
linked together, and qualitative results are gathered and analyzed.  
1.4 Research objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to obtain information about Software-Defined Networking 
and more specifically to study security and availability features or capabilities of the 
SD-LAN technologies in the scope of healthcare networks. 
With this thesis, the author wants to improve availability, visibility and control over 
network infrastructure with centralized and more intelligent network architecture. 
The research is focused on network segmentation and policy-driven features. The 
main objective is to research if policy-driven SDN can be used to implement 
networking policies and segmentation more efficiently than a traditionally 
segmented network without compromising security. 
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Research questions: 
What are the benefits and constraints of Software-Defined Networking security 
features in healthcare networks? 
How does policy-driven network architecture support cyber security implementation 
in healthcare? 
Does Cisco SD-Access help to solve segmentation and access control challenges in 
healthcare networks more efficiently than traditional networking? 
 
2 Traditional networking 
This chapter introduces the development, components and challenges of the 
traditional networking. Networks and networking need have grown over the years, 
e.g. due to business digitization and a significant increase of mobile clients. 
Meanwhile, networking technologies as a foundation of providing interconnectivity 
between clients, devices and applications have remained relatively static. (Hill et al. 
2018, 15.) 
2.1 Components of traditional networks 
The distributed control and transport network protocols running inside the routers 
and switches are technologies that allow information travel in form of frames or 
packets travelling in the digital world. (Kreutz, Ramos, Veríssimo, Rothenberg, 
Azodolmolky & Uhlig 2015, 14.) 
Traditional networks are hardware-centric because network functionalities are 
mainly implemented in dedicated appliances. These appliances consist of e.g. 
switches, routers, wireless access points and firewalls. Most services or features 
within these appliances are implemented in dedicated hardware. Most commonly, 
specialized Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) is used for this purpose. 
(Kumar & Mozar 2018, 31.) 
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Network functionality can be broadly classified into three planes. Networking planes 
and their dependences are illustrated in Figure 1 as follows: 
 
 
Figure 1. Networking planes in traditional networking (Subramanian & Voruganti 
2016, modified) 
 
Data plane: Data plane is responsible for the act of moving bits that constitute a 
frame or a packet from an incoming port to an outgoing port. This is also known as 
the forwarding plane. For example, in Ethernet switches the frames coming in from 
one port are forwarded out via one or more of the remaining ports. This level 
includes control-related elements such as packet processing and arrangement. 
(Subramanian & Voruganti 2016.) Also, encapsulation and decapsulation of frames or 
packets as well as dealing with headers such as 802.1q header is taken care of by the 
data plane. 
Control plane: Data plane needs additional information to forward the packet to the 
correct outgoing port. Using Ethernet switches as in the previous example, the 
outgoing port is identified using the destination MAC address learnt by the switch. 
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This act of learning and building awareness about the network in datalink and 
network layers (L2 and L3) is the responsibility of the control plane. The control plane 
learns and gathers information about the network using various protocols. In 
switches, Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is used to detect redundant links and create 
loop-free topology. In routers, routing protocols such as OSPF and IS-IS are used to 
distribute and populate route information thus helping to learn the network 
topology. The important thing here is that the data plane leverages the information 
built by the control plane. (Subramanian & Voruganti 2016.) 
Management plane: While network devices do their job of processing and 
forwarding data traffic, it is crucial to monitor their health and configure them 
according to the need and network policy. Management plane is responsible for the 
ability to monitor, manage and control network devices. The common mechanisms 
to manage networks include for example command-line interface (CLI), SNMP 
protocol. Recently, RESTful APIs have gained in popularity as a management 
protocol. Usually, network administrators are the end users of management plane 
capabilities. (Subramanian & Voruganti 2016.) 
Network policy is defined in the management plane, the control plane enforces the 
policy, and the data plane executes it by forwarding data accordingly. In traditional 
networking, the control and data planes are tightly coupled, embedded in the same 
devices. The structure of the network is often highly decentralized. Traditionally this 
has been considered as an important design principle to guarantee network 
resilience. (Kreutz et al. 2015, 15.) 
Forwarding decisions are made locally within a network device, and those decisions 
are based on the control plane information. Packet forwarding must be fast to meet 
the network performance requirements. This is implemented using ASICs, and it 
implies that data plane entities exist on each network device. In most cases, control 
plane learning involves more than one network device such a group of switches or 
routers. It is comparatively much slower than the forwarding plane depending on the 
protocol used. Network devices must support the most common standard protocols 
for accurate learning of network topology, connectivity, and the related information. 
Because of that, the control plane entities must exist on each network device. 
(Subramanian & Voruganti 2016.) 
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In multi-vendor networks, control and management plane interoperability is 
important for smooth operation. In addition to the coupling of control and data 
planes, parts of management plane protocols such as SNMP are also required to run 
on each network device. However, the most critical parts of management are the 
centralized functions provided by Network Management Systems (NMS). 
(Subramanian & Voruganti 2016.) 
Many steps are needed when a network administrator needs to add or remove a 
network device or a service in a traditional network. First, the administrator will have 
to manually configure each individual network device (e.g. switches, routers, 
firewalls) separately. The next step is using low-level and often vendor-specific 
device-level management tools and commands to update various configuration 
settings, such as Access Control Lists (ACLs) and Virtual LANs (VLANs). In addition to 
the configuration complexity, network environments must tolerate the dynamics of 
faults and adjust them to networking load changes (Kreutz et al. 2015, 15.). 
Traditional management approach makes it that much more challenging for an 
administrator to enforce a consistent set of policies in such a dynamic environment. 
As a result, organizations are more likely to experience security breaches and non-
compliance with implications.  (Traditional vs Software Defined Networking, Ocedo 
n.d.) 
2.2 Complexity and scalability issues 
Regardless of the widespread adoption, traditional IP networks may be hard to 
manage. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the control and data planes are 
tightly bundled together. This makes networks also vertically integrated. The 
traditional approach to building networks assumes that network devices are 
autonomous devices which are both difficult to configure according to predefined 
policies, and to reconfigure to respond to fault, load and functional needs. (Kreutz et 
al. 2015, 15.) 
Continuing optimization of the network for high availability, new applications and 
services result in unique networks. While the network configuration may need a 
business need, this also makes it complex to document, understand, troubleshoot, 
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predict, manage and upgrade. If the network is slow to change or adapt, it can 
disrupt organization to innovate and adopt new technologies. Complex and unique 
networks are also very hard to automate due to the many variations of network 
designs, which leads to a loss of efficiency. (Hill et al. 2018, 16.) 
Different approaches to segment networks add complexity significantly. Using fine-
grained network segmentation organizations end up managing hundreds or 
thousands of VLANs and subnets. On the other hand, large Layer 2 designs are very 
inefficient due to almost inevitable use of Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) for a loop-
free topology. Around 50% of trunk ports are typically blocking and thus unused. 
Using Layer 3 segmentation with VRFs or alternatively with MPLS VPNs (RFC 4364) 
network will scale better but these practices and protocols are often too complex for 
some organizations to handle and need more expensive network devices. Network 
segmentation is presented more in detail in the next subchapter. (RFC7348, 2014) 
2.3 Issues on network security 
One of the main issues on network security is the poor segmentation of LANs 
(sometimes referred as network segregation). The basic form of network 
segmentation at the OSI Layer 2 relies on VLANs. VLAN is used to form a segmented 
Layer 2 domain. Access controls can be enforced at the Layer 3 boundary between 
different VLANs. Using wide-spanned VLANs threatens network availability since they 
are vulnerable to Layer 2 loops in redundant networks. Layer 2 loop inevitably causes 
significant availability issues. (Hill et al. 2018, 17.) 
Segmentation is a network design practice to isolate or filter traffic to limit or 
prevent access between network segments or resources. Network segmentation 
efficiently obstructs or even prevents an attacker to move laterally and escalate 
privileges. Network segmentation can efficiently minimize lateral movement of 
exploits, reduce the attack surface, and minimize the aftermath. It can also 
remarkably aid detection and elimination of attackers on the network. From the 
compliance point of view, many standards such as PCI DSS and ISO ISO27002 13.1.3 
require segmentation of the internal network. (Chismon 2019.) However, 
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segmentation adds complexity to the network, and many models do not scale very 
well. 
Organizations would like to establish end-to-end device or user identity; however, 
there is no place within an IP header to carry mapping information. Many 
organizations use 802.1x framework for authentication. This is common or de facto 
authentication method in corporate wireless deployments. However, it is less 
common in wired networks, which is due to the lack of 802.1x support on clients and 
mostly due the complexity of the deployment. This will lead to inconsistent level of 
security between wired and wireless clients in campus networks. (Hill et al. 2018, 20.) 
 
3 Software-defined networking 
This chapter is an introduction to Software-defined networking (SDN). First, 
definitions, terminology and components of SDN are introduced and then main 
technologies such as SD-WAN and SD-LAN are covered in high-level. 
3.1 Definition of SDN 
SDN is a paradigm or a framework intended to change this existing condition of 
traditional networking by breaking vertical integration, separating the control logic 
from the underlying network devices, supporting centralized network management 
and introducing the ability to program the network. SDN makes it easier to create 
and invent new abstractions in networking, simplify network management and 
promote network evolution by separating network control into manageable and 
adaptable pieces. The separation of concerns between the definition of the network 
policies and intent from the data plane is the key to the desired flexibility. (Kreutz et 
al. 2015, 14.) 
3.2 Terminology and components 
The separation of the control plane and the data plane can be realized by means of a 
well-defined programming interface between the switches and the SDN controller. 
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The controller exercises direct control over the state in the data plane elements via 
this well-defined application programming interface (API). The most notable example 
of this kind of API is OpenFlow. It is important to point out that a logically centralized 
programmatic model does not require a physically centralized system. Demand to 
guarantee adequate levels of efficiency, scalability, and reliability would exclude that 
kind of solution. Instead, production-level SDN network designs resort to physically 
distributed control planes. In general, functional separation, network virtualization, 
and automation through programmable APIs are the key technologies in an SDN 
network. High-level architecture and components of software-defined networking 
are presented in Figure 2. (Kreutz et al. 2015, 2.) 
 
 
Figure 2. Software-Defined Networking high-level architecture (Subramanian & 
Voruganti 2016, modified) 
 
SDN Controller: The SDN controller is a logically centralized entity in charge of 
translating the requirements from the SDN application layer down to the data plane 
of the network devices and providing the SDN applications with an abstract view of 
the network, which may include statistics and events. (Gordon 2015, 593.) 
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Northbound Interface (NBI): Northbound Interfaces are APIs between SDN 
applications and SDN controller. This API offers a Northbound Interface, i.e. a 
common interface for developing network applications. Typically, NBI provides 
abstract network views and enables direct expression of network behavior and 
requirements for the SDN controller. (Gordon 2015, 593.) 
Control to Data Plane Interface (CDPI) or Northbound Interface (NBI): CDPI defines 
the communication protocol between an SDN controller and a CDPI agent of the 
network device, thus enabling control and data plane elements to interact. CDPI 
provides programmable control of all forwarding operations, capabilities, protocol 
advertisement, statistics reports, and event notification. CDPI is also often referred 
as a Southbound Interface (SBI). (Gordon 2015, 593.) 
3.3 SDN technologies 
In this chapter two main SDN technologies, Software-Defined Wide Area Network 
(SD-WAN) and Software-Defined Local Area Network are briefly described. Actually, 
SD-WAN is out of the scope of this thesis but SD-LAN somewhat extends the concept 
of the SD-WAN. These definitions can vary since these are evolving technologies and 
both have vendor specific marketing and feature characteristics. 
SD-WAN 
Software-Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN) solution is a networking service 
offering Wide Area Networking capabilities for the enterprises. It uses virtualization 
and logically separates network on the top of the existing infrastructure. It is used to 
simplify the deployment, configuration and operation of the enterprise network. It is 
based on the overlay model where the actual traffic is encapsulated and then 
forwarded over the existing network fabrics (underlay). Overlay and underlay are 
covered in detail in the next chapter. The overlay model adds the intelligence to the 
edge devices without need of any change in the existing network infrastructure. Edge 
devices are managed through a separated control plane, centralized controller, 
which can be cloud based. (Rajendran 2016, 19.) 
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SD-LAN 
SD-LAN builds on the principles of the SD-WAN concept and extends SDN capabilities 
to the access or edge layer. Access layer consists of intermediate and access switches 
as well as WLAN infrastructure along with endpoints and end users. In the same way, 
the purpose is to increase automation, adaptability, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness 
by decoupling the control plane from the data-plane and by separating the logical 
network (overlay) from the underlaying network infrastructure. Features of the SD-
LAN include automatic provisioning (zero-touch), centralized management, 
application awareness, role-based authentication, reporting, self-healing and self-
optimization. In summary, SD-LAN combines existing IT technologies such as Identity 
and Access Management (IAM), Network Performance Monitoring (NPM), 
Application Performance Management (APM) and big data analytics with managed 
LAN solution. (White Paper SD-LAN 2018, 1-4.) 
4 Cisco Software-Defined Access (SD-Access) 
This chapter contains the description of Cisco Software-Defined Access (SD-Access), 
which is a commercial SD-LAN solution. The key components including control and 
plane protocols, which play a main role in the test case, are explained. 
4.1 Overview 
SD-Access solution is a programmable network architecture which is a part of Cisco’s 
Digital Network Architecture (Cisco DNA) (Cisco 2019.). Cisco describes it as the 
industry's first intent-based networking solution, which provides automated 
software-based policy and segmentation from the edge of the network to the 
applications. Automated segmentation, quality of service, analytics and other end-to-
end services create a consistent user experience anywhere without compromising on 
network security. (Hill et al. 2018, 25.) This is accomplished with a single network 
fabric across LAN and WLAN the purpose of which is to create a consistent user 
experience without compromising on security (Cisco Software-Defined Access, 
Solution overview 2019.). Cisco SD-Access architecture is shown in Figure 3. The main 
components and protocols are described in the following chapters. 
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Figure 3. Cisco SD-Access architecture (Software-Defined Access 1.0 White Paper 
2018.) 
 
4.2 SD-Access components 
4.2.1 SD-Access Fabric 
One of the key components of the SD-Access is the SD-Access Fabric. Basically, a 
fabric is a network topology in which network nodes interconnect via one or more 
network switches. The word fabric is a metaphor to illustrate the idea that if network 
components and their relationships were documented on paper, the lines would 
weave back and forth so densely that the diagram would resemble a woven piece of 
cloth. (Rule 11 reader 2016.) 
In SD-Access fabric network is divided into two different layers. The bottom layer is 
dedicated to the physical devices and forwarding of traffic. It is called an underlay. 
Another upper layer is an entirely virtual layer where wired and wireless users and 
devices are logically connected, and services and policies are applied. This layer is 
known as overlay. (Hill et al. 2018, 26.) 
Network underlay is the underlying layer that handles the physical connections in an 
existing or a newly built network (Somboon & Wachsmann 2018, 5). Underlay is 
comprised of the physical network devices, such as switches, routers, wireless LAN 
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access points (Aps) and controllers (WLCs). Network underlay of the SD-Access relies 
on some traditional layer 3 routing protocol to provide a simple, scalable and 
resilient infrastructure for communication between the network devices. All network 
nodes of the underlay have to establish IP connectivity between each other. (Hill et 
al. 2018, 28.) 
Network overlay is the logical network layer that is the virtualized topology built on 
top of the physical underlay. Overlay is used for client traffic and requires several 
additional technologies to operate. The main building blocks of the SD-Access fabric 
are (Hill et al. 2018, 29.): 
Fabric data plane: the logical overlay is created with packet encapsulation using 
VXLAN with Group Policy Option (GPO). VXLAN and VXLAN GPO are explained in 
detail in chapter 4.3.1. 
Fabric control plane: the logical mapping and resolving of users and devices is 
performed Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP). Control plane protocol LISP is 
explained in detail in chapter 4.3.2. 
Fabric policy plane: The network policy rules are applied to the devices based on 
their Scalable Group Tags SGTs and group-based policies. Unique SGT IDs are not 
based on IP addresses. This means that subnet membership of the device has no 
significance for which policy rules are applied. This technology is also called Cisco 
TrustSec. 
Overlay supports both layer 2 and layer 3 virtual topologies and is able to operate 
over any IP-based network with built-in network segmentation such like VRFs. (Hill et 
al. 2018, 29.) 
The main components of SD-Access fabric are shown in Figure 4. The fabric itself is 
not tagged in the figure but the cloud around the network nodes describes the SD-
Access fabric best. 
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Figure 4. SD-Access fabric components (Software-Defined Access - Solution Design 
Guide 2019.) 
 
4.2.2 Edge Node 
Basically, Edge Nodes are the equivalent of an access layer switch in a traditional LAN 
network where all the client endpoints reside and are attached to the network. In 
SD-Access fabric Edge Nodes act as Anycast Layer 3 gateways and are responsible for 
endpoint registration, LISP forwarding and VXLAN encapsulation/de-encapsulation. 
(Software-Defined Access - Solution Design Guide 2019.) 
4.2.3 Intermediate Node 
Intermediate Nodes are the equivalent of distribution switches providing Layer 3 
interconnection between Edge Nodes and Border Nodes in the fabric underlay. No 
LISP control plane messages, VXLAN encapsulation/de-encapsulation or SGT 
awareness requirements exist on an Intermediate Node. (Software-Defined Access - 
Solution Design Guide 2019.) 
4.2.4 Border Node 
Border Nodes act as the gateway between the SD-Access fabric site and the networks 
external to the fabric. Most SD-Access implementations use an external border for a 
common exit point from a fabric to the rest of the network including the Internet. 
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External border advertises a default route to the fabric per VRF or Virtual network 
and is the gateway of last resort for the Edge Nodes. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 
as the preferred routing protocol is used for external connectivity and used to 
advertise internal fabric prefixes outside the fabric. Virtual Networks inside the fabric 
are mapped VRF instances outside the fabric using VRF-Lite. (Software-Defined 
Access - Solution Design Guide 2019.) 
4.2.5 Control Plane Node 
Control Plane Nodes serve as central mapping database information inside the fabric. 
Control Plane Nodes track the endpoints in the fabric site and associate the 
endpoints to Edge Nodes, decoupling the endpoint IP address or MAC address from 
the location in the network. This is accomplished by using LISP (chapter 4.3.2). 
Control Plane functionality can be combined to the same network element with 
Border Node functionality. (Software-Defined Access - Solution Design Guide 2019.) 
4.2.6 DNA Center 
DNA Center can be assumed as an SDN controller of the SD-Access solution. It is the 
central management plane containing automated workflows required to command 
and control SD-Access fabric. Architecture of the DNA Center is shown in Figure 5. 
High-level workflows of the DNA Center include design, policy, provision and 
assurance. DNA center platform is used to manage and automate network 
deployments, manage authentication settings and control role-based access. Host 
onboarding and policy enforcement capabilities are provided through the Cisco ISE 
integration. Cisco Platform Exchange Grid (pxGrid) API is used for this purpose. It also 
uses telemetry data gathering, machine learning and analytics to provide assurance, 
troubleshooting, network health and trending information about the network. (Hill et 
al. 2018, 95-96.) 
DNA Center is a mandatory component in SD-Access; however, on the other hand it 
can be implemented without SD-Access solution. 
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Figure 5. DNA Center architecture (Hill et al. 2018, 96.) 
 
4.2.7 Cisco ISE 
Basically, Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) is an AAA (Authentication, Authorization 
and Accounting) server with modern features and capabilities. Cisco ISE hosts the 
external policy repository in SD-Access network, and it integrates with DNA Center. 
Functions include dynamic access control of users and devices and scalable group 
management for group-based access policy. Group-based policies in SD-Access are 
defined based on logical groups of users, devices or applications, and as a 
relationship between these groups they further define the access control rules based 
on L3 and L4 classifiers. These classifiers are then pushed to the network elements 
for the policy enforcement. ISE identifies and profiles the network devices and 
endpoints in a variety of forms including AAA/RADIUS, 802.1X, MAC Authentication 
Bypass (MAB). (Hill et al. 2019, 120-122.) DNA Center is a mandatory component in 
SD-Access but on other hand it can be implemented without SD-Access solution.  
4.3 SD-Access protocols 
4.3.1 Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN) 
Technologies like server virtualization has put extra demands for the network 
infrastructure. Physical server hardware as a VM Host has now numerous VMs 
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(Virtual Machines) and each has its own MAC address. This leads to larger MAC 
tables to allow hundreds of thousands of VMs to communicate with each other. In a 
data center there can be the need for thousands of VLANs to segment VMs to 
different groups or networks.  The present VLAN limit of 4,094 is insufficient in 
modern large data centers. Encapsulation scheme called Virtual eXtensible Local 
Area Network (VXLAN) has been developed to address the various requirements 
stated above. (RFC7348. 2014) 
VXLAN is a solution to support flexible and large-scale networks over a shared 
common physical underlay network. VXLAN is an IETF standard encapsulation (RFC-
7348). VXLAN is a Layer 2 overlay scheme over a Layer 3 network. It uses MAC 
Address-in-User Datagram Protocol (MAC-in-UDP) encapsulation to provide a 
mechanism to extend Layer 2 segments across the network. VXLAN is a solution to 
support a flexible, large-scale multitenant environment over a shared common 
physical infrastructure. The VXLAN packet format is shown in Figure 6. (VXLAN 
Overview 2015) 
 
 
Figure 6. VXLAN packet format (VXLAN Overview. 2015) 
 
VXLAN is used as a primary technology for the fabric data plane in SD-Access. VXLAN 
encapsulation is used for two main reasons. First, VXLAN includes the source Layer 2 
Ethernet header and secondly, it also provides special fields for additional 
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information. Additional fields, virtual network (VN) ID and group ID are used in SD-
Access to achieve ability to manage IP-based network with build-in segmentation 
(VRF/VN) and group-based policy. These fields along with other information used by 
control plane protocol (introduced in chapter 4.3.2) are presented in Figure 7. Some 
enhancements to the original VXLAN specifications have been added by Cisco. The 
most notable insertion is the ability to use security group tags (SGTs). This new 
VXLAN format is currently an IETF draft known as VXLAN with Group Policy Option 
(or VXLAN-GPO). (Software-Defined Access 1.0. 2018) 
 
 
Figure 7. VXLAN-GPO packet format (Software-Defined Access 1.0. 2018) 
 
VXLAN Flags field has been extended to 16 bits over the existing 8-bit VXLAN 
RCF7348. The first previously reserved flag bit now indicates if the Tenant System 
Identifier (TSI) Group membership is being carried within the Group Policy ID field. 
The previously reserved next 16 bits of the VXLAN header are now used for Group 
Policy ID. The Identifier indicates the source TSI Group membership or Scalable 
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Group Tag (SGT) in case of SD-Access is being encapsulated by VXLAN. (Internet-
Draft, VXLAN Group Policy Option 2017) 
In SD-Access fabric segmentation takes place at both at macro and micro level 
through virtual networks and SGTs, respectively. Virtual networks are the same as 
VRFs, which are completely isolated from one another within the SD-Access fabric. 
Virtual Networks provide macrosegmentation between endpoints residing in 
different Virtual Networks. All endpoint clients within a virtual network can 
communicate with each other by default. SGTs are used within a single VN to provide 
micro-segmentation functionality within the VN. (SD-Access Segmentation Design 
Guide 2018) 
4.3.2 Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) 
Fabric-Control Plane uses the Locator / Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP), which is 
a mapping system developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) whose 
purpose is to separate the routing locator (switch or access point where a client is 
attached to the network) and identifier (identity of the client). LISP is used as a 
control plane protocol in SD-Access. Identity is a either an IP or MAC address. LISP 
accomplishes this by keeping track of which switch or access point a device joins 
when connecting to the network. LISP uses a scalable routing architecture separating 
Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) that are the client IP or MAC addresses from the Routing 
Locators (RLOCs), which are the IP addresses of the network devices or Egress Tunnel 
Routers (ETRs) as they are referred to in LISP. The host mobility capability is achieved 
as a benefit of this separation. LISP allows a user to move around the network and 
attach to different switches and access points without having to change or renew 
their IP addresses. Anycast Gateway, Virtual Network Extranet and Fabric Wireless 
are improvements that Cisco has implemented in LISP for it to work optimally in 
combination with SD-Access. (Somboon & Wachsmann 2018, 6.) 
LISP dramatically simplifies traditional routing environments by removing the need 
for each network element to process every possible IP destination address and route. 
It addresses this challenge by moving remote destination information to a centralized 
map database that allows each network element to manage only its local routes and 
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query the map system to locate the point of attachment of the endpoints. This 
provides a highly scalable routing architecture. (Hill et al. 2018, 29.) 
The most notable terms of LISP are defined below: 
Endpoint Identifier (EID): EID is IP or MAC address identifying client endpoint in LISP 
terminology. Endpoint Identifiers are advertised as EID-Prefixes by Egress Tunnel 
Routers described below. (Locator ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Overview 2018) 
Routing Locator (RLOC): RLOC is an IP address of the Egress Tunnel Router and an 
output of an EID-to-RLOC mapping lookup. RLOC identifies network element where a 
particular endpoint is attached to the network. Reachability is achieved within RLOC 
space though traditional routing protocols such as IS-IS. (LISP Overview – Basic 2017) 
Egress Tunnel Router (ETR): ETR is a tunnel endpoint network element responsible 
for decapsulating traffic which is leaving the fabric towards an endpoint. In SDA this 
is the role of the Edge Node. (RFC6830) 
Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR): ITR is a tunnel start point responsible for encapsulating 
traffic that enters the fabric from the endpoint. In SDA this is the role of the Edge 
Node. (RFC6830) 
Map Server (MS): MS is a network element that learns of EID-Prefix mapping entries 
by accepting registration requests from an ETR.  In SDA Control Plane Node holds the 
LISP mapping database which associates EID to its RLOC. (RFC6833) 
Map Resolver (MR): This is also one of the roles of Control Plane node. The purpose 
is to accept Map-Requests, typically from an ITR, and determine whether or not the 
destination IP address is part of the EID namespace. Map-Reply is sent if the 
appropriate EID-to-RLOC mapping is found. Otherwise a Negative Map-Reply is 
returned. (RFC6833) 
Proxy ETR (PETR): PETR is the role of the Border Node used for inter-networking 
between fabric and non-fabric sites or to another fabric. Packets destined outside of 
the fabric are sent to PETR because LISP control plane will not have any direct route 
to the destination. (Locator ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Overview 2018) 
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Proxy ITR (PITR): Is the role of the Border Node used for inter-networking between 
fabric and non-fabric sites or to another fabric. PITR acts like PETR but in another 
direction and behalf of the non-fabric sites. (Locator ID Separation Protocol (LISP) 
Overview 2018) 
When a packet enters the fabric on an Edge Node (ITR), a lookup (Map-Request) is 
made by using LISP to determine the location of the destination IP address in the 
fabric. It is notable that the destination can be outside of the fabric as well. Control 
Plane Node acts as an MS and resolves the EID-to-RLOC mapping from its database. 
The result of the Map-Reply is the loopback IP address of the ETR (or PETR if the 
destination endpoint resides outside of the fabric). ITR builds a VXLAN header and 
puts that on the front of the original packet, and then puts a new IP header in front 
of that with a destination IP of the egress ETR loopback and a source IP of its own 
loopback. The packet is handed to the overlay and routed to the ETR where it is 
decapsulated and sent to the destination endpoint. Fabric packet flow is illustrated in 
Figure 8. (Knight 2017.) 
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Figure 8. Fabric packet flow with LISP as a control plane protocol (Knight 2017, 
modified) 
 
5 Networking in Healthcare 
The majority of the healthcare in Finland is offered by the public sector and 
specialized healthcare is provided by hospital districts.  In Finland, there are five 
university hospitals, which are the central hospitals for their districts. Out of these 
five Tampere University Hospital and Kuopio University Hospitals are customers of 
Istekki Oy. Network and healthcare technology experts were interviewed to gain 
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knowledge about special needs and challenges of medical networks.  The segmenting 
methods of the networks of these two hospitals were looked over. 
Modern hospital networks are not only built for physicians and nurses to access 
patient records, review lab results and prescribe medication on a daily basis. Modern 
clinical networks contain various connected medical devices such as ECG monitoring 
devices, MRI scanners, laboratory automation and automated medicine dispensing 
cabinet to name a few. These devices are also called as Internet of Medical Things 
(IoMT) devices. The characteristics of the connected medical equipment or medical 
IoT add extra requirements for the hospital networks. 
Radiology and medical imaging are examples that have some identified specific 
networking needs. The modalities (e.g. MRI, CT, Ultrasound scanners) send the 
images to the PACS (Picture Archiving and Communication Systems) Server by using a 
DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) protocol, and the 
transmission of medical imaging data requires a considerable amount of network 
bandwidth. Many workstations and medical devices in the DICOM network are 
identified by their IP address, a communication port (TCP/IP port) and a name, so-
called AETitle. In many cases, there are expensive legacy devices in the network, 
which are still adequate for the clinical use. According to IoT threat report of Palo 
Alto networks (2020 Unit 42 IoT Threat Report 2020, 8.), 83% of medical imaging 
devices in United States hospitals run on unsupported operating systems. There was 
increase of 56% from 2018, as a result of Windows 7 reaching its end of life. Using 
legacy equipment and identification based on the IP address require static network 
settings in many cases, which on the other hand adds extra challenges on mobility 
and network segmentation. 
Another sample group of connected medical equipment are patient monitoring 
devices. Many hospital wards are operating with fewer human resources, and clinical 
decisions on patient care are more and increasingly relying on the patient monitoring 
systems. These devices are often sensitive for the network latency and failures. 
Monitoring systems often contains various components such as bedside patient 
monitors (sometimes called as Intensive Care Units, ICUs), corridor displays, central 
stations/units and servers. Some of the systems require multicast to associate to the 
central unit, which adds an extra demand on the network configuration. 
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Other general characteristics include various and often embedded outdated 
operating system versions and closed system architectures. That means that these 
devices are vulnerable to malware or other malicious attacks. Medical devices are 
certified, and security feature and fix updates drag behind and any alterations on the 
configuration are not generally accepted. This means, for example, that it is not 
possible to enroll a certificate to the device and to configure it to enable 802.1x 
authentication. Another need is mobility as some of the devices are portable. Many 
devices are installed in a cart trolley or attached to stands and can be for example 
moved from the operating room to another. Some of the devices use WLAN instead 
of the wired LAN. 
Network segmentation of these hospitals relies heavily on traditional segmentation 
methods. Different networks mainly share the same physical network and are 
logically segmented by using subnets (OSI layer 3) and VLANs (OSI layer 2). Extensive 
private subnets are further partitioned into subnetworks, and each logical network is 
assigned to the corresponding individual VLAN. 
At least three main models for healthcare networking were found as a result of the 
interviews and researching the hospital networks. This research does not take a 
stand if the hierarchical network design models are two-tier or three-tier. The main 
focus is on segmentation practices. However, most of the hospital campuses are 
three-tier layer models including core, campus and access layers. Most hospitals use 
specific medical VLANs for network connected medical devices. In some cases, there 
are also mixed networks containing normal IT devices such as desktop workstations 
or laptops as well as medical devices. According to the Palo Alto Networks research 
(2020 Unit 42 IoT Threat Report 2020, 7.), 72% of United States healthcare VLANs 
mix IoMT and IT assets and only 3% of healthcare VLANs exclusively host IoMT 
devices. This lowers the barrier for lateral movement and can allow malware to 
spread from the workstation to vulnerable medical devices on the same network. 
The first of these segmentation models is a healthcare network model with stretched 
medical VLAN (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Healthcare network model with stretched medical VLAN 
 
In this model, layer 3 gateway of the hospital resides in a centralized router or layer 
core switch. In every case layer 3 boundary uses a redundant model with two routers 
or a layer 3 switch. The core device acts as a boundary between the bridged Layer 2 
portion of the campus and the routed Layer 3 portion of the hospital network. 
Separate VRFs are used to segregate different networks from each other. In these 
cases, workstation networks are separated from the medical network. Access switch 
and distribution layer switches are configured with 802.1q trunk port to forward 
layer 2 traffic between the layers. Medical VLAN is stretched across multiple 
buildings and access switches for various legacy reasons. In this legacy model, 
different medical devices such as medical imaging equipment and patient monitors 
are connected to the very same VLAN and IP subnet. Spanning Tree Protocol is used 
to provide a loop-free topology when using redundant links. Various versions of the 
STP are used depending on the generation and on the vendor used including Per-
VLAN Spanning Tree (PVST), Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol (MSTP) and Rapid 
Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP). This model is agile and scales well when medical 
network is needed in a new campus building or on a new hospital ward access 
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switch. It also supports the mobility of the medical devices as the devices can be 
moved to another location and are able to onboard to the same IP segment without 
the need to alter static network configuration. This model, however, has some 
significant drawbacks on the availability and on other network security as stated in 
chapter 2.3. In case of the wiring and configuration error a layer 2 loop can occur. In 
this design it can spread everywhere in the hospital network. Downtime of the 
hospital network can be a major risk for patient safety. Another risk is lateral 
movement in the unrestricted IP segment. A malware or malicious user can move 
from a system to another and mostly with a little effort since some of the medical 
systems are running outdated operating system versions. The second identified 
model is the healthcare network model with local medical VLANs as illustrated in 
Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Healthcare network model with local medical VLANs 
 
In this design model, medical networks are segregated from each other by dividing 
them based on building or distribution layer level. In most cases there are different 
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network segments as well for different types of medical equipment. Usually at least 
medical imaging network is separated from all the rest of medical devices. Layer 3 
gateway and VLAN trunking is accomplished in the same manner as in the first 
model. This model significantly reduces the risk of layer 2 loop to spread extensively. 
The risk of malicious lateral movement also differs remarkably from the first 
stretched model, since networks are segmented by the location and/or the intended 
use of the medical devices. Local VLANs add some design and operational 
requirements for the portable medical devices, since the IP segments are different 
between the campus buildings and wards. Mobility often requires the use of DHCP to 
dynamically allocate network setting for the devices. Segmentation also adds some 
complexity for the network design and configuration. It can be difficult to maintain 
the allocation of the subnets easy and scalable from the routing point of view. Also, 
more VLANs are needed to configure at the distribution and core layer.  
The third recognized model is routed layer 3 healthcare network model. The aim of 
this model is to minimize layer 2 segments and to bring layer 3 boundary closer to 
the access layer. There are at least two variations of the routed models identified 
during the research. The first one is a simple full-mesh topology model where 
network is formed by allowing all participating VRFs to communicate with each 
other. This behavior is achieved by each VRF exporting its route targets that are in 
turn imported by all the other demanded VRFs. This model can also be referred to as 
full-mesh L3 VPN. One L3 VPN can be dedicated to the medical devices or for a group 
of medical devices such as medical imaging. The second variation is hub and spoke 
topology, which is star-shaped topology where the hub VRF is in the center (Figure 
11). 
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Figure 11. Routed (Hub and Spoke) healthcare network model 
 
In hub and spoke topology model, all spoke VRFs can only communicate with the hub 
VRF directly. Usually the communication of the spokes is not permitted via hub and 
traffic must first go through the firewall before going to another hub. This behavior is 
achieved by each spoke VRF exporting its route targets, and these are imported by 
hub VRFs. Spokes will only import the route target of the hub VRF. The models can 
be implemented by using VRF-Lite or MPLS as a transit. Routed models significantly 
restrict the layer 2 segments and STP domains, which reduce the risk of the layer 2 
loops. It also gives more control over the traffic since traffic can be carried through 
the firewall security policy to restrict traffic between locations and different 
networks. This will in turn add complexity and some expenses because more 
configuration and capabilities are needed when implementing layer 3 design. 
All new healthcare network implementations will utilize some layer 3 model, and the 
first two models are considered as legacy models. There is also some EVPN-VXLAN 
based campus architectures, which are out of the scope of this thesis. 
Apart from the network design, the authentication practices in medical networks 
were examined. Most of the networks containing medical devices do not use 802.1x 
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authentication in general. This is due to the limitations in the clients. In some cases, 
MAB with static MAC address lists is used. This will add some extra burden to the 
healthcare technology experts when onboarding new equipment to the network. 
 
6 Implementation 
This chapter briefly discusses the implementation of the SD-Access PoC network for 
Istekki. It makes sense to introduce only the essential parts of the implementation, 
such as key components, underlay and overlay topologies. The actual configuration 
and installation (components such as DNA Center and Cisco ISE installation) is out of 
the scope of this thesis. 
After DNA Center is integrated with Cisco ISE, network design sites and basic 
resources such as DHCP, DNS, SNMP, CLI credentials and AAA services are configured 
in DNA Center Design workflow. Also, other global settings such as IP address pools 
for underlay networks, and Virtual Networks along with Wireless profiles are defined 
here. Actual Virtual Networks are configured from the policy workflow and later 
provisioned to the fabric from provision workflow in chapter 6.2. There is no other 
configuration to be made if group-based policies are not enforced at this point. 
Scalable groups are configured later in test cases. 
6.1 Underlay implementation 
The implementation of the SD-Access PoC network fabric started with underlay 
planning. It makes sense to install and connect critical components of the fabric such 
as Border Nodes and Control Plane Nodes to the data center out of the actual 
campus site. This also allows configuring and connecting multiple fabric sites to the 
network via traditional IP WAN, MPLS or SD-WAN. Distributed campus fabric with IP 
transit network was chosen as the model for the underlay implementation. Since 
Istekki has an existing MPLS network, it makes sense to leverage MPLS VPN or L3 
VPN to interconnect all undelay network elements. One single VRF was configured 
for MPLS VPN to interconnect Control Plane Nodes, Border Nodes and campus site. 
Connections for DNA Center, Cisco ACE, Wireless controllers and NOC network were 
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established through route leaking. The logical diagram of the underlay network is 
shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. Logical SD-Access Underlay and network services 
 
Cisco Catalyst 9500 series switches were chosen as Border Node, Control Plane Node 
Roles and Intermediate Nodes. The roles of the Border Node and Control Plane Node 
were combined to simplify implementation, which is more cost-efficient. Cat9500 
switches were interconnected and then connected to data center routers (DCRs in 
Figure 12) with redundant 10 Gbps links. Open Shortest Path First (OSFP) was used to 
share routing information in the underlay network. 
Intermediate nodes were connected to the MPLS transit network through external 
BGP (eBGP). The campus site was connected with two independent Intermediate 
Nodes to two MPLS edge routers (ER1 and ER2 in Figure 12) situated in different 
locations to enhance redundancy. The role of the Intermediate Nodes is to route 
packets in the fabric underlay, and these devices do not take part in VXLAN 
encapsulation/de-encapsulation nor they do not run LISP. In other words, their job is 
to provide connectivity between Control Plane Node, Border Node and Edge Node 
loopback addresses and switch VXLAN encapsulated UDP packet to their destination. 
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This overhead adds requirement to configure MTU to support Ethernet jumbo 
frames on all links. 
Cisco Catalyst 9300 series switches were chosen as Edge Nodes. Two logical Edge 
Nodes (EN3 and EN4) consist of two switches, which are stacked together, and both 
switches are connected to the intermediate nodes with 10 Gbps links. Cisco DNA 
Center LAN automation was used to interconnect and configure Edge Nodes to help 
provisioning. LAN Automation will use selected ports of the Intermediate Node from 
DNA Center GUI to discover and on-board new devices in the network. It will also 
discover and automate each parallel path between network elements to provide 
optimal forwarding paths in underlay network. Routed IS-IS (Intermediate System to 
Intermediate System) layer 3 links are used to interconnect Edge Nodes. Loopback 
and link addresses are allocated automatically from underlay IP pool configured in 
the design workflow.  LAN automation will also upgrade automatically the software 
of the Edge Nodes. 
6.2 Virtual overlay 
Once the network elements were discovered and IP reachability achieved, an IP-
based transit site and a fabric site were created as a perquisite for the virtual overlay. 
Edge Nodes were selected from the DNA Center GUI and added to the fabric (symbol 
“E” next to network elements in Figure 13). WLAN controller (WLC) was added to the 
fabric. It is notable that Intermediate Nodes are not part of the overlay network. 
Collocated Border Nodes and Control Plane Nodes were selected and assigned as 
“CP+Border” (symbol “C |B” next to network elements in Figure 13). It was decided 
to use Layer 3 handoff border automation to establish connectivity to external 
networks. VNs associated with the fabric were extended outside of the network with 
eBGP and sessions were established per VN. Preconfigured Layer 3 handoff network 
was used to automate configuring of BGP configuration. After the devices were 
assigned with their roles it was possible to create the fabric. 
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Figure 13. SD-Access fabric creation in DNA Center 
 
The actual provisioning of the devices took some minutes to complete. Adding of 
Virtual Networks to allow host onboarding was made from Host Onboarding tab 
(Figure 14). Open authentication was selected as authentication template to allow 
MAB authentication for medical and IOT devices along with 802.1x, which was used 
as authentication method for normal end-user clients. More detailed settings for 
authentication templates were configured in design workflow. Demanded Virtual 
Networks were added. 
 
 
Figure 14. SD-Access fabric onboarding settings in DNA Center 
 
DNA Center configures anycast layer 3 gateways on all Edge Nodes and associates 
them with LISP instances. Control plane LISP configuration was made as part of the 
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automation. Border automation configures, remote AS number, VLAN interfaces with 
allocated IP addresses as well as neighbor IP addresses. Interfaces facing external 
network are configured as trunk interfaces. However, since Istekki is running 
different vendor routers in their MPLS network, external connectivity requires some 
manual configuration as well. Because of this, border configuration has to be 
reviewed from the CLI. Logical diagram of the underlay network is shown in Figure 
15. 
 
 
Figure 15. SD-Access Fabric (Virtual Overlay) 
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7 Test cases 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze if Cisco SD-Access solution improves the 
information security in the networks and to verify the behavior in policy-driven 
network architecture.  
7.1 Test environment 
As described in chapter 2.3, segmentation is complex and mostly a manual task in the 
traditional network. Segmentation in policy-driven network was selected as the main 
theme for the test cases in this thesis. The goal was to demonstrate segmentation 
operation and to give an idea how segmentation in healthcare networks should be 
planned and later implemented. 
The test cases are selected to demonstrate segmentation operation and behavior in 
policy-driven network architecture.  As discussed in chapter 4.3.1, segmentation 
within SD-Access fabric takes place at both macro and micro level through Virtual 
Networks (VN) and Scalable Group Tags (SGTs), respectively.  
The test environment for the test cases consists two stacks of Cisco Catalyst 9300 
switches and two Cisco Catalyst 9500 intermediate nodes in a SD-Access site. Border 
nodes reside behind MPLS network in a datacenter (not shown in Figure 16 but they 
were already explained in detail in Implementation chapter 6.1). Client nodes are 
connected to the Edge Nodes (EN3 and EN4). Two fabric capable Cisco Catalyst 9300 
multigigabit 48-port switches are stacked as edge nodes. Edge node is managed as a 
single logical switch. Two Edge Nodes are needed for most of the test cases because 
otherwise in certain cases the packets can be switched locally. With two independent 
Edge Nodes VXLAN, the tunnels will be formed and RLOC entries will be queried from 
the Control Plane Node. VXLAN encapsulated traffic is analyzed to verify 
segmentation functionalities. 
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Figure 16. Physical network topology for test cases 
 
The test cases were chosen to support real life segmentation needs in healthcare 
networks. First, the background and objective of the test case were described as a 
scenario and illustrated with network topology fit for the case. Then a policy was 
formed in a DNA Center with help of the Cisco ISE and deployed to the network. The 
third phase of the test case was to generate test traffic between segmented network 
endpoints to see if segmentation functions as expected. Lastly, the segmentation 
policy operation from GUI and underlaying network protocols such as LISP was 
verified if it was applicable for the test case. Packet capture (PCAP) was used to 
analyze that VN ID and Group ID are in place in VXLAN encapsulated traffic. 
7.2 General prerequisites 
All needed Virtual Networks were configured via DNA Center as part of the design, 
policy and provision workflows. This was briefly explained in implementation chapter 
6.2. DHCP server was configured to allocate appropriate IP addresses when 
requested by the anycast gateway DHCP relay (ip-helper in Cisco). DHCP settings 
were configured in DNA Center Design workflow for each IP pool. 
 
 
 
42 
Monitor session was configured to capture traffic from the Intermediate Nodes. It is 
important to configure the monitor session for both of the Intermediated Nodes 
since there are redundant links and some of the traffic flows are load balanced. 
Ingress and egress packets are captured and written in a local packet capture file 
from the both EN4 facing interfaces with following commands. 
 
Device# monitor capture testcase interface Te1/0/3 both 
Device# monitor capture testcase file location flash:testcase1_phase1.pcap 
 
Before every test, a new file location was created. The capture was started and 
stopped with following commands. 
 
Device# monitor capture testcase start 
Device# monitor capture testcase stop 
 
After each test case or part of the test case packet capture file was copied from the 
switch for further analysis. Wireshark was used to decode and display details of the 
packet headers. 
All test cases were accomplished by using real life medical devices. Digi Connect ES 
was used as a medical device for the test cases. Digi Connect ES is a terminal server 
designed for hospital use which provides serial over Ethernet connectivity. It is used 
to connect for example operating room equipment such as ventilators and patient 
monitors with galvanic isolated RS-232 ports. Digi Connect ES was configured to use 
DHCP to automatically obtain an IP address. 
7.3 Test case 1 – Macrosegmentation with VNs 
The purpose of this test was to demonstrate macrosegmentation in SD-Access. 
Network endpoints with different security levels were placed in separate Virtual 
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Networks to restrict access between endpoints. The logical topology for the test case 
1 is shown in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17. Test case 1 – Macrosegmentation with VNs 
 
Two Virtual Networks were selected to test and verify the network segmentation 
functionality. An employee workstation was connected to the VN-Istekki, and the 
patient monitor (or terminal server) was connected to the VN-IoT. Both Virtual 
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Networks were configured using the DNA Center (explained in chapter 6.2).  Both 
devices were assigned to the respective LANs and Virtual Networks dynamically as 
part of the authorization process described in chapter 7.3.1. As connected clients 
resided in different Virtual Networks or VRFs, they should not be able to 
communicate. Test traffic was generated between the clients. Ping command was 
used to check whether clients were able to reach each other via IP protocol. There 
was also a management web server running in port TCP 80 of the terminal server. An 
attempt was being made to connect to this service by using web browser. 
7.3.1 Prerequisites 
Both devices had to be connected to the network before the test can be started. The 
authorization of the employee workstations was accomplished using 802.1x 
authentication with EAP-TLS (details are out of the scope of this thesis). Since Digi 
Connect ES client endpoint does not support any sophisticated 802.1x authentication 
such as EAP-TLS in wired mode, MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB) was used as an 
access control technique. A new Endpoint Identity Group was configured for this 
medical device group and the MAC address of the Digi Connect ES was added into 
group. Endpoint Identity Group with one endpoint is shown in Figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18. Creation of the Endpoint Identity Group in Cisco ISE 
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Cisco ISE was configured to authenticate and authorize MAC authentication. First 
Wired MAB condition was configured to match MAC Authentication Bypass service 
based on authentication request from the switch (Figure 19).  
 
Figure 19. Policy setting for the predefined Wired MAB condition 
 
A Switch stack EN4 was previously configured with appropriate authentication 
templates and interface settings were configured as a part of the fabric provisioning 
from the DNA Center. In the authorization policy (Figure 20) a condition was made to 
authenticate Medical devices. If an attribute name of the IdentityGroup dictionary 
equals Digi-Medical, then Medical Devices authorization result is applied. 
 
 
Figure 20. Authorization policy for the medical devices 
 
Authorization result consists of attributes which were returned to the switch (Figure 
21). Access Type is ACCESS_ACCEPT when the authorization was accepted, and 
access to network was granted. Another important attribute is the Tunnel-Private-
Group-ID which is the name of the VLAN in the Endpoint Node. 
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Figure 21. Authorization profile result for the medical devices 
 
Now the medical device endpoint was able to authenticate, and the appropriate 
VLAN was configured as part of the authorization process. 
 
7.3.2 Test case 
Both devices were attached to the network. The employee workstation was attached 
to the VN-Istekki, and the patient monitor endpoint was connected to the VN-IoT. 
Both automatically got an IP address and network configuration from the DCHP 
server. The employee workstation had the IP address 10.75.240.28 and the patient 
monitor had the IP address 10.100.252.10. 
Control plane information can be respectively examined from the CLI. The LISP map-
cache from the Control Plane Node (BN1) showed that EID 10.75.240.28/32 
(Employee workstation) was registered and can be found in VRF Istekki_VN via 
Locator 10.98.209.34 which is the loopback IP address of the EN4 (Figure 22). EID 
10.100.252.10/32 (Digi Connect ES/Patient monitor) was also registered and can be 
found in different VFR IoT_VN via the same Locator. 
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Figure 22. LISP EID-to-RLOC entries of the devices for test case 1 
 
Ping command was used to determine if the patient monitor was reachable from the 
employee workstation. Command “ping 10.100.252.10” was entered at the 
command prompt of the employee workstation and the results indicated that the 
destination host was not reachable. In addition, there was an attempt to reach the 
management service from the browser window. The browser session timed out 
because the web server of the patient monitor terminal server was not reachable. 
Packet capture was examined to find out why an endpoint residing in different 
Virtual Network was not reachable and to demonstrate macrosegmentation 
functionality. Packet capture indicated that ICMP ping echo requests along with TCP 
SYN packets were sent to the destination IP address (Figure 23). Further examination 
of the TCP SYN packet revealed that the original IP packet was encapsulated into a 
UDP packet, and a VXLAN header (highlighted with red color) was added. The 
information indicating the Virtual Network VN-Istekki was shown as VXLAN Network 
Identifier value 4100. The same value is shown in Figure 22 as an instance ID (IID) 
value, which was used by control plane protocol LISP to separate mappings to 
different VRF contexts. Additional IP header (highlighted with green color) was added 
and the packet was routed via underlay network. The source IP address is the 
loopback address of the EN4, and the destination IP address is the loopback address 
of the BN1, which was also a VTEP address for this particular packet. The packet was 
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routed to the Border Node because there was no EID-to-RLOC mapping in LISP and 
packet was routed to the non-fabric network via default route. In LISP terminology 
BN1 acted as PETR for this particular session. Ultimately packets are routed to the 
firewall and dropped based on the security policy. 
 
 
Figure 23. Packet capture of the first reachability test for test case 1 
 
However, the connection between Virtual Networks can be established if the 
communication is allowed from the firewall. Exact explanation of routing outside the 
fabric and firewall security policy are out of the scope of this thesis. This was 
accomplished to see that communication can be enabled and to see VXLAN header 
information of the packets for the returning traffic. 
In this test case, the firewall resided outside of the fabric behind the Border Nodes. 
The default route from the Border Nodes was pointing to the external MPLS VPN 
(VRF). These VRFs are separate per Virtual Networks and from the MPLS network 
traffic reaches the firewall interface if there is no better route to the destination. A 
firewall policy rule was made to allow ICMP traffic between the VN-Istekki and VN-
IoT networks and the ping command was used again to determine if the patient 
monitor was now reachable from the employee workstation. Now the ping command 
was successful, and the patient monitor was reachable. 
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Examination of the packet capture of the ICMP echo request packet (Figure 24) 
revealed that the same Network Identifier value 4100 was added to the VXLAN 
header (highlighted with red color) as was shown in the first reachability test. An 
additional IP header (highlighted with green color) was added and packet was routed 
from the EN4 to the BN1. Then the packet exited the fabric and was routed to the 
firewall. 
 
 
Figure 24. Ingress ICMP packet capture of the second reachability test for test case 1 
 
Egress packet (Figure 25) from the Intermediate Node to the EN4 was examined, and 
this time the Network Identifier value was changed to 4101 (highlighted with red 
color), which indicates Virtual Network and IID VN-IoT. The source and destination of 
the additional IP header (highlighted with green color) showed that the packet was 
coming from BN1 to the EN4. There were also two reply packets per one ICMP 
session, and these were routed outside of the fabric and back again to another VN. 
VNI values for the return traffic were in reverse order. 
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Figure 25. Egress ICMP packet capture of the second reachability test for test case 1 
 
7.4 Test case 2 – Microsegmentation with SGTs 
In this test case, the microsegmentation in SD-Access was studied and demonstrated. 
The network endpoints of the healthcare clinical environments can be attached to 
the same Virtual Network to achieve isolation from other non-medical segments; 
however, there can still be need for more restrictive security controls. The restricting 
policy is applied with respective Scalable Group Tags. Test case 2 is illustrated in 
logical Figure 26. There are still two separate Virtual Networks but now there are also 
Scalable Group Tags (SGTs) assigned to each type of the client. SGTs are marked with 
a tag symbol next to the client. 
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Figure 26. Test case 2 - Microsegmentation with SGTs 
 
The clients connected to the separate Virtual Networks were not able to 
communicate without route leaking or permitting security policy at the firewall as 
demonstrated in the Test case 1 – Macrosegmentation with VNs. 
The same two Virtual Networks from the previous test case were selected to test and 
verify network segmentation functionality. The employee workstation was 
connected to the VN-Istekki, and it was not used in this test case. The patient 
monitor (or terminal server) was connected to the VN-IoT along with the medical 
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workstation. The medical client endpoints were connected into the same Virtual 
Networks and an SGT was given for them as part of the authorization process. The 
test traffic was generated from the medical workstation because the terminal server 
does not have a proper interface to execute a command. Ping command was used to 
check whether the clients were able to reach each other via IP protocol. An attempt 
was made to connect the management web server running in port TCP 80 of the 
terminal server with a browser. 
7.4.1 Prerequisites 
Scalable groups had to be configured before the test case can be carried out. After 
DNA Center version 1.3.1.0 all group-based policy data is created and managed in 
Cisco DNA Center. That data is then synchronized to Cisco ISE. (Release Notes for 
Cisco DNA Center, Release 1.3.1.x 2019.) 
A scalable group for medical workstations was configured from the policy section of 
the DNA Center shown in Figure 27. A scalable group for patient monitor was 
configured in the same manner. A 16-bit SGT value can be configured; however, for 
this test case it was left default because it is an incrementing value. SGT value 19 was 
configured for the workstations and value 18 for the patient monitors along with 
Virtual Network IoT-VN for the both groups. Both Scalable Groups with their values 
are shown in Figure 28. These groups were synchronized to Cisco ISE. 
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Figure 27. Creation of the Scalable Group from DNA Center 
 
 
Figure 28. Scalable Groups view in the DNA Center policy section 
 
In the previous test case an authorization policy for the patient monitor was 
configured (chapter 7.3.1). An Endpoint Identity Group was made for the medical 
workstations and same authorization result attributes were used for these endpoints 
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to inform network elements to authorize endpoint to the IoT-VN VLAN. This time also 
a respective Security Group was assigned by authorization policy for both of the 
Endpoint Identity Groups (Figure 29). 
 
 
Figure 29. Authorization policy with Security Groups 
 
At this point, the client endpoints were able to connect to the network and the 
authorization policy was assigned correctly as shown in Figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30. Authorization policy log for the test case 2 
 
7.4.2 Test case 
Both medical devices were attached to the network and were authorized to connect 
to the VN-IoT. Both automatically got the IP address and network configuration from 
the DHCP server. The medical workstation had the IP address 10.100.255.3 and the 
patient monitor had had the IP address 10.100.252.10. 
The default rule is to permit traffic between separate Scalable Groups if there are no 
policies defined. Ping command was used to determine if the patient monitor was 
reachable from the medical workstation. Command “ping 10.100.252.10” was 
entered at the command prompt of the employee workstation and the results 
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indicated that the destination host was reachable. In addition, management service 
was attempted to reach from the browser window. Login screen appeared, and the 
web server of the patient monitor terminal server was reachable. 
Control plane information was examined with sh ip lisp map-cache command from 
the Control Plane Node (Figure 31). EID 10.100.255.3/32 (medical workstation) was 
founded in VRF IoT_VN via Locator 10.98.209.34 and EID 10.100.252.10/32 (Digi 
Connect ES/Patient monitor) was founded in the same VFR IoT_VN via Locator 
10.98.209.33. 
 
 
Figure 31. LISP EID-to-RLOC entries of the devices for test case 2 
 
In this test case both endpoints resided in the same Virtual Network, so Layer 2 
communication was used between the endpoints. Layer-2 Extension setting for 
IoT_VN Virtual Network enables L2 LISP instance and associates a L2 VNID to this 
pool so that the Ethernet frames can be carried within the fabric. Layer2 EID-to-RLOC 
mappings were examined from EN4 (Figure 32). The MAC address of the patient 
monitor was shown as an EID. 
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Figure 32. EN4 L2 LISP instance EID-to-RLOC entry for test case 2 
 
Respectively, EID-to-RLOC mapping for MAC address of the medical workstation was 
shown when the same command is entered at EN3 (Figure 33). 
 
 
Figure 33. EN3 L2 LISP instance EID-to-RLOC entry for test case 2 
 
Packet capture was examined to solve if the network is functioning as expected. 
Packet capture indicated that ICMP ping echo requests were sent to the patient 
monitor. Echo replies were also shown. Further examination of the TCP SYN packet 
(Figure 34) revealed that the original IP packet was encapsulated into a UDP packet 
and a VXLAN header was added as in the test case 1. This information is highlighted 
in red color. This time Network Identifier value 8195 was not indicating a Virtual 
Network as it was in test case 1 (4101 for IoT-VN). This time the service Ethernet 
mode of the LISP was used to encapsulate Layer 2 packets. VNI value 8195 was used 
to indicate Ethernet services for IoT VLAN (VLAN id 1028 in this fabric). The most 
important field for this test case was Policy Group ID. Scalable Group Tag (SGT) 
information of the of the source endpoint was carried in that field as explained in 
chapter 4.3.1. Group Policy ID value was 19 which was the value of the 
Medical_Workstation Scalable Group. 
An additional IP header (highlighted with green color) was added and the packet was 
routed via underlay network. The source IP address is the loopback address of the 
EN4 and the destination IP address is the loopback address of the EN3, which was 
also a VTEP address for this packet and the Edge Node where the patient monitor 
was connected. 
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Figure 34. Packet capture of the SYN packet for test case 2 with default policy 
 
EN3 switch forwards the packet to the interface where the patient monitor was 
attached as the default permit policy was applied. The patient monitor sent a SYN-
ACK packet as a response to establish a connection. Closer investigation of the SYN-
ACK packet revealed that the Group Policy ID had now value 18 which was the value 
of the Scalable Group Medical_PatientMonitor. This information is highlighted with 
red color in Figure 35. An additional IP header showed that the packet was routed 
back to EN4 from EN3. 
 
 
Figure 35. Packet capture of the SYN-ACK packet for test case 2 with default policy 
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Next, a custom policy was defined to deny traffic from the medical workstations to 
the patient monitors. This policy was created from the Group-Based Access Control 
policies of the policy section in the DNA Center. The easiest way was to point and 
click the preferred point in the policy matrix (Figure 36).  
 
 
Figure 36. Group-Based Access Control Policy matrix in DNA Center 
 
A policy creation windows opened. Policy status was enabled and predefined 
contract Deny IP with logging was selected. The creation of the policy is shown in 
Figure 37. It is notable that these policies are unidirectional. For both directions a 
second policy is needed. The policy was synchronized from DNA Center to Cisco ISE 
when the save button was clicked. 
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Figure 37. Group-Based Access Control Policy creation 
 
The newly created policy was needed to deploy from the Cisco ISE. Policy 
configuration and TrustSec configuration were pushed to the relevant network 
devices from Cisco ISE (Figure 38). 
 
 
Figure 38. Cisco ISE TrustSec configuration change notification 
 
The newly created policy can be examined from the CLI with show cts TrustSec 
command. It can be noted from the output in Figure 39 that the policy was 
successfully enforced. Policies can be set to monitor mode to test the security 
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policies without enforcing them but in this case RBACL Monitor lines had a value 
“FALSE” and these policies were actually enforced. 
 
 
Figure 39. Policy enforcement is examined from the CLI 
 
The test traffic was generated from the medical workstation. The results of the ping 
command indicated that the destination host was not reachable. Also, the 
connection attempt to the web server of the patient monitor timed out. 
A closer examination of the packet capture in Figure 40 indicated that there was no 
reply from the destination and only ICMP echo request can be seen. Correct Scalable 
Group value is shown in Group Policy ID field. As in the previous test with default 
policy, the source IP address is the loopback address of the EN4, and the destination 
IP address is the loopback address of the EN3. 
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Figure 40. Packet capture of the ICMP packet for test case 2 with deny policy 
 
As the final part of this test a custom policy with a customized contract was made. A 
new Access Contract was made from the DNA Center (Figure 41). An action item was 
made under the contract to permit HTTP traffic to the port TCP 80. The default action 
was set to deny, so all other IP traffic was denied. The newly made contract was 
associated with the previously made policy as shown in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 41. Access Contract creation in DNA Center 
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Figure 42. Contract is associated with a policy 
 
Test traffic was again generated from the medical workstation. In addition of HTTP 
connection, this time also an HTTPS connection was attempted to the SSL socket at 
TCP-port 443. The results of the ping command indicated that the destination host 
was not reachable. Also, the HTTPS connection attempt timed out. However, an 
HTTP connection attempt to the server of the patient monitor was successful. 
The examination of the packet capture revealed that there were no ICMP echo 
replies. Also, only SYN-packets to the TCP-port 443 were shown. Successful TCP-
handshake was made when the connection was made to the HTTP socket of the web 
server. VXLAN header of the SYN-ACK packet is visible in Figure 43 below. SYN-packet 
arrived in the destination endpoint with SGT 19 and SGT 18 (highlighted with red 
color) was used for SYN-ACK in the Group Policy ID field of the VXLAN header. SYN-
ACK was routed back to EN4 loopback address from EN3 via underlay as highlighted 
in green. 
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Figure 43. Packet capture of the SYN-ACK packet for test case 2 with custom policy 
 
7.5 Test case 3 – Segmentation with dynamic profiling and onboarding 
This case was accomplished by using real branded medical equipment to gain 
knowledge about dynamic profiling with Cisco ISE medical NAC. As discussed in 
chapter 5, the authentication of medical devices is often based on the MAB because 
many of the devices lack 802.1x supplicant and do not have an option to install 
certificates for advanced authentication manners. The purpose of this test case was 
to examine if dynamic profiling policies can be used to automate medical device 
onboarding and thus enhance authentication and network security in hospital 
network. 
7.5.1 Prerequisites 
Medical equipment used in this test case included GE Carescape B450 and Philips 
IntelliVue MP40 patient monitors. First, the patient monitor devices were connected 
to the network to see if Cisco ISE can identify devices without any pre-configured 
profiling or endpoint identity groups. The Ethernet ports of the devices were 
connected to the EN3 switch stack, and both devices were powered on. The logs of 
the ISE were examined (as shown in Figure 44). The results indicated that 
authentication failed and access to the network was rejected. Endpoint profile of the 
GE patient monitor was unknown; however, the Philips patient monitor was profiled. 
A closer examination revealed that the Philips patient monitor was profiled as a 
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Philips-Device based on the MAC OUI (Organizationally Unique Identifier) by the 
predefined default Cisco ISE profiler. 
 
 
Figure 44. Cisco ISE live logs before Medical NAC 
 
Next, Medical NAC XML-file was downloaded and imported to the Cisco ISE. 
Currently Cisco ISE Medical NAC Profile Library contains over 300 profiling policies for 
medical devices. These policies can be reviewed and further modified if needed.  
7.5.2 Test Case 
After installing the Medical NAC library, the patient monitor devices were connected 
again to the network to see if anything has changed. The authentication of the 
devices failed and access to the network was rejected. This was an expected result 
since the devices were not included in any endpoint group and there was no 
authorization policy which allowed devices to onboard. A closer examination of the 
authentication details of the live logs indicated that now both patient monitors were 
more precisely identified by the profiling policies. The authentication details of the 
GE patient monitor (Figure 45) indicate that it was identified as a Date-Ohmeda-
Device, which was quite accurate since the exact make for the device is Ge-Datex 
Ohmeda. GE Healthcare acquired Instrumentarium's Datex-Ohmeda division in 2003. 
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Figure 45. Authentication details of the GE patient monitor 
 
The authentication details of the GE patient monitor (Figure 46) indicated that it was 
identified as a Philips-Patient-Monitoring-Device instead of the previous Philips-
Device endpoint profile. 
 
 
Figure 46. Authentication details of the Philips patient monitor 
 
The next phase was to figure out what information is used by the profiling policies. 
Datex-Ohmeda-Device profiling policy is quite simple since it has only one condition, 
which is based on the MAC OUI of the device. When checking the first three octets 
(00-40-97) of the MAC address and comparing it to the IEEE OUI list, it can be 
recognized that it is allocated to the “DATEX DIVISION OF INSTRUMENTARIUM 
CORP.” The profiling policy of Philips-Patient-Monitoring-Device includes six 
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condition rules (Figure 47). The first one is based on the MAC OUI of the device, and 
the rest of the rules are used to increase the certainty factor of the profiling policy. 
Five additional rules are based on the DHCP class id and parameter request list, 
which are unique for certain devices. However, MAC OUI rule (Device-Rule1) is 
sufficient to reach the minimum certainty factor value 5. IEEE has allocated 00-09-FB 
MAC OUI for the Philips and it is used only for “Philips Patient Monitoring” purposes. 
DHCP parameter rules are often used for CoA (Change of Authorization) purposes, 
which makes sense since the device has to be successfully authorized and onboarded 
to the network before it can send any DHCPDiscover or request packets. 
 
 
Figure 47. Philips-Patient-Monitoring-Device profiler policy 
 
The next phase was to configure a policy to authorize these devices by using profiling 
policies. A new authorization policy rule was made under the Wired MAB policy set 
in Cisco ISE. Now both recognized endpoint profiling polices were joined together in 
the same rule using OR connector shown in Figure 48. 
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Figure 48. Cisco ISE conditions studio with endpoint policies 
 
A new policy was made to authorize GE and Philips patient monitoring devices to the 
IoT network with authorization result “Medical Devices” and to assign a SGT tag 
Medical_Patient (Figure 49). 
 
 
Figure 49 Authorization policy for the dynamically profiled patient monitor 
 
After the policy creation in the Cisco ISE, the patient monitor devices were connected 
again to the network to see if onboarding was successful. Now the patient monitors 
were able to authenticate and connect to the network. The authorization was 
successful and both devices got an IP address from the DHCP server (Figure 50 and 
Figure 51). 
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Figure 50. Cisco ISE authorization log for the GE patient monitor 
 
 
Figure 51. Cisco ISE authorization log for the Philips patient monitor 
 
Cisco ISE recorded the IP addresses and created sessions for both devices. The 
onboarding process of the patient monitors were successful, and both devices were 
reachable from the Medical workstation. 
 
8 Results 
In this chapter all results of the test cases are presented and examined. The 
outcomes of the test cases are explained case by case. 
8.1 Test case 1 
In the first test case, macrosegmentation with Virtual Networks or VRFs was studied 
and tested in practice. The employee workstation and the patient monitor were 
placed in different Virtual Networks.  
As the result of the test case 1 the employee workstation was fully isolated from the 
medical device. The medical device was not reachable from the Employee 
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workstation. It was found in the packet capture that packets were sent to Border 
Node (PETR) and VNI of the Virtual Network was visible. The results of the test case 1 
were expected as isolation of the endpoints in different security segments is 
accomplished with layer 3 separation. The test endpoints were placed in different 
segments and IP subnets and communication between the segments was not 
enabled. The ultimate reason for unsuccessful communication between the 
endpoints is a missing route from a segment to the other. However, communication 
can be enabled by leaking the routes between VRFs or by interconnecting the 
networks via a firewall as was tested in the second part of the test case. 
Macrosegmentation with Virtual Networks provides complete isolation between 
traffic and devices in one Virtual Networks of those in other Virtual Networks. 
Although in terms of segmentation, Virtual Networks do not really add anything new 
to traditional networking. The same level of segmentation can be achieved by using 
VRFs with VRF Lite or MPLS VPN technique. 
One significant benefit is that authentication template configuration and 
macrosegmentation capabilities are achieved by configuring the SDN controller, 
which in this case is the DNA Center. The network settings for the sites are planned 
as part of the design workflow, then Virtual Networks are defined in the policy tab 
and finally, the configuration is pushed to the devices as a part of the provisioning 
process. This facilitates implementation, minimizes human error in configuration and 
helps to achieve a sufficient level of macrosegmentation and access control features 
to the network. Within the hospital campus network, these features would efficiently 
save operating expenses and support network implementation. Some constraints 
remain since it is not possible to gain end-to-end policy capabilities in a multi-vendor 
environment. Also, some of the border hand-off and high availability configurations 
are still manual tasks. 
8.2 Test case 2 
In this test case Scalable Groups and Group-Based Access Control Policies were 
studied. Scalable Groups exploiting VXLAN Group Policy Option were used within the 
same Virtual Network. The second test case consisted of three different parts. The 
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first one was to test network operation with default permit policy. In the second 
part, a predefined deny policy was used and in the last test a custom policy was 
made to allow only specific traffic. 
In the first part of the test all traffic between the test endpoints was permitted as the 
default permit policy was enabled. However, in this test SGTs were used in the 
VLXLAN header as the packet capture demonstrated. There was no simply specific 
policy implemented to deny communication between endpoints. In the second part 
the predefined deny policy was configured and enforced by the Cisco ISE. Now all 
traffic from the medical workstation to the patient monitor was denied based on the 
SGT values in the Group Policy ID field of the VXLAN header. The packet was dropped 
by the dynamically configured and pushed ACL at the destination network element 
(EN3 in this test case). In the third part, a custom contract was made to allow 
communication to only a specific TCP port. Test traffic and packet capture 
demonstrated that Group-Based Access Control policy with a configured contract 
allowed only the intended traffic and all other test traffic was denied by the ACL. 
Also, in this test case all parts of the tests worked fine, and the results were as 
expected. In this test case both endpoints were placed in the same subnet and 
Virtual Network. Layer-2 Extension for Virtual Network was used to implement LISP 
Ethernet services and to encapsulate L2 frames. The configuration of the Scalable 
Groups and simple policies was easy and straightforward; however, a fine-grained 
authorization of a larger group of devices could be quite complex with MAC 
addresses and Endpoint Identity Groups. 
Microsegmentation presents the next level of segmentation and provides isolation 
within the LAN segment, which in this case is Virtual Network. Scalable Groups and 
group-based policies offer fine-grained policy control for the hospital networks. The 
test case proved that considered groups within the medical network can assist to 
achieve policy-driven segmentation model while maintaining an adequate level of 
mobility. Absence of the properly working white-list model is one significant 
constraint. The policy matrix would be reversed to use default deny instead of the 
default permit. In the white-list model only identified and eligible traffic is allowed, 
while everything else is denied by default. This would support the principle of least 
privilege in the network. 
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8.3 Test case 3 
The third test case covered dynamic and automated medical device profiling and 
onboarding. This test case was accomplished by using real life branded medical 
equipment to make it as practical as possible. In many cases these devices lack 
network security features such as 802.1x authentication supplicant. 
In the prerequisites of this test case devices were connected to the network to get 
information if these devices can be by default identified. Then the medical NAC 
library was installed to achieve improved profiling capabilities. The prerequisites 
demonstrated that the default ISE library is not sufficient to support reliable dynamic 
profiling. 
After the installation of the medical NAC library both devices were accurately and 
properly identified. Authorization rules were made by using dynamic endpoint 
profiling policies to automate device onboarding and policy enforcement. The 
patient monitoring devices were accurately identified by profiling policies and 
successfully onboarded to the desired IoT Virtual Network. 
The test case demonstrated that reliable authentication can be accomplished 
without using laborious and static MAC address lists. It would be ideal if all the 
devices can be identified by using a digital certificate; however, this is not the case 
with most of the embedded medical devices. Dynamic profiling works well hand in 
hand with the SGTs from the test case 2. SGTs can be assigned dynamically as part of 
the authorization, and the policies can be immediately enforced. This will in turn 
efficiently support cyber security implementation in hospital network and bring 
network architecture closer to the policy-driven world. 
However, profiling devices based only on the MAC OUI might be too modest a way to 
reliably identify devices in an environment that demands high network security since 
MAC address can be spoofed. The profiling policy of the Philips patient monitoring 
device introduced additional condition rules to increase the certainty level. CoA 
(Change of Authorization) feature is necessary to dynamically change AAA attributes 
after the device is authenticated. 
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9 Conclusions 
This thesis studied how information security in healthcare networks can be improved 
with Software-Defined Networking. This thesis included the implementation of Cisco 
SD-Access PoC environment and practical test cases to demonstrate the SDN 
behavior and segmentation in policy-driven architecture. 
The test cases were linked together, and they demonstrated the implementation of 
networking policies. The implementation of the segmentation to the network was 
more efficient compared to a traditionally segmented network. The results of the 
test cases indicate that network segmentation can be enhanced and automated 
using policy-driven segmentation features in SD-Access network. The third test case 
demonstrated that branded medical equipment can be efficiently and dynamically 
identified before being authorized to the hospital network segment. 
Cisco SD-Access takes campus network closer to policy-driven environment. Specific 
segmentation patterns and security enforcement decisions can be defined in an 
imperative way. Pre-defined templates are automatically pushed to the new network 
devices and after the network policy has been altered. However, the network could 
not be managed from the single controller. Defining of network segments, policies 
and authorization rules included managing of at least DNA Center and ISE. 
Microsegmentation is one of the benefits of Software-Defined Networking security 
features when using Cisco SD-Access. Microsegmentation in traditional LAN networks 
is either complicated or almost impossible. For example, Private VLANs (PVLANs) are 
an administrative nightmare. SGTs were an efficient way to isolate or make more 
restrictive security controls within the subnets, VRFs or Virtual Networks. Profiling 
and automated onboarding removes the need of using static MAC address list with 
MAB. Other clear benefits include automation and visibility over network. Network 
policy provisioning can be automated, and new devices can be deployed 
automatically with zero touch provisioning. The controller can be used to gather 
telemetry data such as Netflow to form network assurance knowledge and thus help 
in troubleshooting. 
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There are also some constraints and drawbacks. SDN controller configuration and 
relying on APIs hide the actual network configuration, which can pose challenges in 
troubleshooting situations. Network administrators still need to know what is lying 
under the hood and have a good idea of the protocols in use. CLI and basic 
understanding of protocols is still needed even though network assurance and 
monitoring tools are evolving. 
SDN controller can also act as a single point of failure. Network configuration cannot 
be altered or reviewed if the controller is down. This can be addressed by using DNA 
Center cluster in case of Cisco SD-Access. Healthcare organizations need to be self-
contained and prepared for cyber threats. One part of the contingency planning is 
that the availability of critical components of the network infrastructure is secured. 
In addition, SDN technology changes the network abstraction, which can be 
confusing. Earlier a network administrator had to understand VLANs, ACLs and VRFs, 
and within the SDN same objects can be referred as groups, contracts and Virtual 
networks. 
Cisco SD-Access can help to solve segmentation and access control challenges in 
healthcare networks by reducing the need for separate subnets for every single 
clinical environment, while still maintaining a sufficient level of security. The level of 
scalability is also increased when a new clinical system does not automatically mean 
implementing of new subnet. The same IP network segment can be used with 
dynamic IP addressing scheme, and a new Scalable Group is defined to provide 
microsegmentation capabilities, which efficiently reduces the chance of lateral 
movement and assists in isolation of vulnerable devices. 
As the result of this thesis, the network segmentation scheme for hospital network 
can be designed. Different Virtual Networks for clinical, administrative and 
supporting environments can be designed along with fine-grained 
microsegmentation practices. An intelligent device profile-based microsegmentation 
approach would be ideal for healthcare. Multiple factors should be considered when 
segmentation practices are designed, including device type, function, mission 
criticality, and threat level. This provides an isolation approach that significantly 
reduces lateral movement and the potential impact of cross-infection. Network 
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segmentation and especially microsegmentation with precise authentication will 
promote to break the cyber kill chain through the establishment of cascading 
network security controls.  
There were also immediate benefits from the research. The dynamic profiling of 
medical devices has already been implemented in a new hospital building when test 
cases were completed. There was also a set of profiling policies for heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) devices and it has also been utilized. 
10 Discussion 
SDN technologies are here to stay, and SDN has been more widely deployed in the 
data center. Many WAN deployments and especially enterprise LAN or campus 
deployments are underway. Several vendors as well as open source projects use 
different methods of implementation, and this leads to a variety of models and 
protocols. 
The implementation of Cisco SD-Access PoC environment for Istekki office network 
was one of the most laborious tasks. The underlay planning and installation of 
different components took a few iterations. The upcoming relocation of office 
premises and the urgency of other projects forced to postpone the PoC network 
expansion and the overall thesis project. There were also some problems with the 
configuration and some software bugs, which posed additional challenges for the 
project. 
The next phase is to build a complete production network site for new premises. This 
involves more segmentation and automation design as requirements increase. Some 
additional improvements include Cisco Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) 
datacenter integration and Cisco Stealthwatch implementation to enable security 
visibility through NetFlow monitoring and analysis. Another future task is to integrate 
other Istekki locations into the same technology by implementing multiple fabrics 
and connecting them with a transit network. The best and most reliable results from 
the point of view of healthcare networks would be obtained if Cisco SD-Access fabric 
were implemented in the hospital. However, this requires more testing and an 
increase in the maturity level of the solution. 
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The firewall integration is needed to map SGTs with security policies. This will help to 
get the most out of microsegmentation. There are also new solutions emerging to 
endpoint profiling, such as Endpoint Analytics which leverages telemetry probes and 
deep packet inspection when identifying the devices connected to network. This 
could add extra certainty for dynamic profiling. Healthcare organizations should 
employ solutions that can identify device types and the characteristics of their 
network behavior to fully leverage the benefits of microsegmentation capabilities. 
This thesis project was long-lasting project and at first finding the right direction was 
slightly difficult. Finding up to date and adequate source material was somewhat 
challenging. The theory and technologies of the field are evolving rapidly and are 
often vendor centric. Overall, comprehensive and very reliable research on SDN and 
especially on SD-LAN technology was not possible to accomplish. On the other hand, 
there are not many complete commercial SD-LAN solutions available on the market. 
Also, this thesis did not focus on more widely documented open source solutions, so 
those also had to be excluded. If the research had widely focused on various 
technologies, the area of cyber security such as network segmentation could not 
have been mapped so extensively. 
Segmentation and healthcare point of view were selected as focus and it helped to 
delimit the scope of the thesis. Practical test cases were the most interesting parts of 
this project, and the test cases helped to understand how SDN solutions can improve 
information security in hospital networks. In general, this thesis project was an 
educational and interesting task. It allowed to combine the theory of modern 
networks, best-practices and practical research.  
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